Read the November 2016 Issue of Journal of Management!

3340359442_b93f0f9aa9_o-1The November 2016 issue of Journal of Management is now available online, and can be accessed for the next 30 days! The November issue covers a variety of topics, including articles on organizational transparency, shared leadership-team performance relations, and the effects of autonomy on team performance.

Authors Anthony J. Nyberg, Jenna R. Pieper, and Charlie O. Trevor contributed the article “Pay-for-Performance’s Effect on Future Employee Performance: Integrating Psychological and Economic Principles Toward a Contingency Perspective,” which suggests that bonus pay may have a stronger effect on future performance than merit pay, among other findings about pay-for-performance. The abstract for the paper:

Although pay-for-performance’s potential effect on employee performance is a compelling issue, understanding this dynamic has been constrained by narrow approaches to pay-for-performance conceptualization, measurement, and surrounding conditions. In response, we take a more nuanced perspective by integrating fundamental principles of economics and psychology to identify and incorporate employee characteristics, job characteristics, pay system Current Issue Covercharacteristics, and pay system experience into a contingency model of the pay-for-performance–future performance relationship. We test the role that these four key contextual factors play in pay-for-performance effectiveness using 11,939 employees over a 5-year period. We find that merit and bonus pay, as well as their multiyear trends, are positively associated with future employee performance. Furthermore, our findings indicate that, contrary to what traditional economic perspectives would predict, bonus pay may have a stronger effect on future performance than merit pay. Our results also support a contingency approach to pay-for-performance’s impact on future employee performance, as we find that merit pay and bonus pay can substitute for each other and that the strength of pay-for-performance’s effect is a function of employee tenure, the pay-for-performance trend over time, and job type (presumably due to differences in the measurability of employee performance across jobs).

Another article from the issue, entitled “Social Media for Selection? Validity and Adverse Impact Potential of a Facebook-Based Assessment” from authors Chad H. Van Iddekinge, Stephen E. Lanivich, Philip L. Roth, and Elliott Junco delves into the hazards that arise when recruiters use social media platforms like Facebook to screen job applicants. The abstract for the paper:

Recent reports suggest that an increasing number of organizations are using information from social media platforms such as Facebook.com to screen job applicants. Unfortunately, empirical research concerning the potential implications of this practice is extremely limited. We address the use of social media for selection by examining how recruiter ratings of Facebook profiles fare with respect to two important criteria on which selection procedures are evaluated: criterion-related validity and subgroup differences (which can lead to adverse impact). We captured Facebook profiles of college students who were applying for full-time jobs, and recruiters from various organizations reviewed the profiles and provided evaluations. We then followed up with applicants in their new jobs. Recruiter ratings of applicants’ Facebook information were unrelated to supervisor ratings of job performance (rs = −.13 to –.04), turnover intentions (rs = −.05 to .00), and actual turnover (rs = −.01 to .01). In addition, Facebook ratings did not contribute to the prediction of these criteria beyond more traditional predictors, including cognitive ability, self-efficacy, and personality. Furthermore, there was evidence of subgroup difference in Facebook ratings that tended to favor female and White applicants. The overall results suggest that organizations should be very cautious about using social media information such as Facebook to assess job applicants.

You can read these articles and more from the November 2016 issue of Journal of Management, which is free for the next 30 days, by clicking here to view the issue’s table of contents! Want to stay current on all of the latest research published by Journal of Management? Click here to sign up for e-alerts to receive notifications for new issues and Online First articles!

*City image attributed to Mark Goebel (CC)

How Do Customers and Companies Benefit from Service Firm Transparency?

JSR Cover[We’re pleased to welcome Andreas B. Eisengerich, who collaborated with Omar Merlo, Seigyoung Auh, and Hae Eun Helen Chun on their paper “Service Firm Performance Transparency: How, When and Why Does It Pay Off?” from the May issue of Journal of Service Research.]

Calls for greater business transparency have become louder in recent years and transparency has risen to the top of the agenda of many organizations. Businesses in a wide range of industries have started to embrace transparency, as their managers swear by the benefits of providing accessible and objective information to customers. Yet, many firms remain wary of the benefits of transparency and are unsure about how to implement it. How does transparency impact customers’ relationships with a firm? Is being transparent worth the risk? In our research, we focus on one particular aspect of firm transparency, which we deem particularly important to customers and firms. We term it performance transparency, and it reflects the extent to which customers view the information provided by businesses about their service performance as accessible and objective. We find that performance transparency benefits both customers and the firm. Customers benefit because when service quality is difficult to evaluate prior to a purchase, transparency can enable customers to minimize uncertainty by “seeing through” the firm and its offerings. Companies benefit because in a context where it is increasingly more difficult to conceal negative information about a firm’s performance, transparency can actually be used as a source of competitive advantage that increases a customer’s purchase intention and reduces price sensitivity. Surprisingly, we also find that being transparent best impacts companies that tend perhaps to be the most afraid of transparency.

You can read “Service Firm Performance Transparency: How, When and Why Does It Pay Off?” from Journal of Service Research by clicking here. Want to know about all the latest news and research from Journal of Service Research? Just click here to sign up for e-alerts!


Yeyi Liu is an Assistant Professor at Leeds Business School. He holds a BSc in Industrial Engineering and MSc in Management Science and Engineering from Xi’an Jiaotong University, China. He also holds a PhD from Imperial College London. Prior to joining Leeds University Business School, he worked as research associate at Strathclyde University Business School.

Andreas Eisingerich

Andreas B. Eisingerich is an Associate Professor of marketing at Imperial College Business School, Imperial College London. He earned his PhD at the University of Cambridge and worked at the Center for Global Innovation at the University of Southern California, Marshall School of Business. He has published on customer-brand relationships, customer engagement, and service management in the Journal of Consumer Psychology, Journal of Marketing, Journal of Service Research, Journal of Business Research, Harvard Business Review, and MIT Sloan Management Review, among others.

Seigyoung Auh

Seigyoung Auh is an Associate Professor of global marketing at Thunderbird School of Global Management. He earned his MBA and PhD from The Ross Business School, University of Michigan. He is also a research fellow at the Center for Marketing and Public Policy Research, Villanova University. His research interests are in knowledge sharing in sales teams, effect of leadership on extra-role behavior of frontline service employees, and customer orientation diversity. He has published articles in various outlets, including Journal of Service Research, Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science, Journal of Consumer Psychology, International Journal of Research in Marketing, Journal of Retailing, Journal of Product Innovation Management, Marketing Letters, Journal of Personal Selling & Sales Management, Journal of Business Research, and Industrial Marketing Management, among others.

Omar Merlo

Omar Merlo is an Assistant Professor of marketing at Imperial College Business School, Imperial College London. He earned his PhD from University of Melbourne, Australia. As a consultant and executive educator, he works with numerous service organizations around the world. His main research interests are in strategic marketing, marketing’s role within the firm, firm orientations, and service management. His research has appeared in journals such as Journal of Service Research, Industrial Marketing Management, Marketing Letters, Journal of Business Research, European Journal of Marketing, MIT Sloan Management Review, and Marketing Theory, among others.

Hae Eun Helen Chun

Hae Eun Helen Chun is an Assistant Professor of marketing at Cornell School of Hotel Administration. Helen earned her PhD in business administration (marketing) from the Marshall School of Business at University of Southern California. Her research interests include consumer experience management in the service context, with a focus on the role of consumer emotions, anticipation, memory, and sensory marketing. Her research has appeared in journals such as Journal of Consumer Psychology, Sensory Marketing, and Foundations and Trends in Marketing, among others.

Does Privacy Make Us Productive?

Modern-day organizations increasingly are seeking to create an “open” work environment—one that makes workers more observable—theorizing that transparency boosts performance. But a new study in Administrative Science Quarterly (ASQ) finds this trend may be counterproductive.

Ethan S. Bernstein of Harvard University published “The Transparency Paradox: A Role for Privacy in Organizational Learning and Operational Control” on June 21, 2012 in ASQ.  Recognizing the prevalence of the trend in factories, the author provides field-based evidence that transparency is not “such a panacea” and makes a strong case for preserving worker privacy in the interest of productivity:

We typically assume that the more we can see, the more we can understand about an organization. This research suggests a counteracting force: the more that can be seen, the more individuals may respond strategically with hiding behavior and encryption to nullify the understanding of that which is seen.

Read the full article in ASQ by clicking here. To learn more about Administrative Science Quarterly, please follow this link.

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Is Transparency Always A Good Thing?

In today’s management world, the growing consensus holds that transparency is good for any organization. But a study in the Journal of Sports Economics (JSE) – noting that sports are a “useful setting in which to examine phenomena that are of broader significance”—offers other findings.

Eric Zitzewitz, Associate Professor of Economics at Dartmouth College and Research Associate at the National Bureau of Economic Research, published “Does Transparency Reduce Favoritism and Corruption? Evidence From the Reform of Figure Skating Judging” on May 2, 2012 in JSE. To view other OnlineFirst articles, please click here.

Professor Zitzewitz explains in the abstract:

Transparency is usually thought to reduce favoritism and corruption by facilitating monitoring by outsiders, but there is concern it can have the perverse effect of facilitating collusion by insiders. In response to vote trading scandals in the 1998 and 2002 Olympics, the International Skating Union (ISU) introduced a number of changes to its judging system, including obscuring which judge issued which mark. The stated intent was to disrupt collusion by groups of judges, but this change also frustrates most attempts by outsiders to monitor judge behavior. The author finds that the “compatriot-judge effect,” which aggregates favoritism (nationalistic bias from own-country judges) and corruption (vote trading), actually increased slightly after the reforms.

To learn more about the Journal of Sports Economics, please follow this link.

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